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The ADA: One Avenue to Appointed Counsel
Before a Full Civil Gideon
Lisa Brodoff, Susan McClellan & Elizabeth Anderson1
The United States is witnessing a growing advocacy for universal “civil
Gideon,”2 the constitutional right to free legal counsel for low-income
people involved in civil litigation.3 The right to counsel has long been
recognized in the criminal context in this country.4 In the civil arena,
however, those who cannot afford to hire attorneys are left to fight to
protect their rights on their own, sometimes against legally represented
federal, state, and local governments attempting to take away their homes,
assets, income, children, or health care.5
This fight for a broad-based right to counsel in the civil arena will likely
be long and hard, with success far from guaranteed. In recent decisions on
both coasts, courts have avoided reaching the civil Gideon issue. For
example, the Maryland Court of Appeals, the state’s highest court, when
given the opportunity to decide whether its state constitution supports
providing attorneys to indigent civil litigants, instead ruled on the
underlying claim.6 In Washington State, a brain-injured litigant directly
raised the issue of a civil right to counsel when the government sues
individuals, but the Court of Appeals found the case moot because the lowincome defendant died while the case was on appeal.7 These cases indicate
that the courts, at least in the short term, may be reluctant even to reach the
merits of the civil Gideon issue, let alone find a sweeping right to free
representation.
In the meantime, low-income clients, unable to afford representation or
to find free legal assistance that they desperately need to protect their rights,
are going to state and federal courts and administrative hearings on their
own. These clients are being evicted, having their homes foreclosed, and
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losing health care and public assistance. Until the larger battle for free civil
representation is fought and won, the legal community must seek other
remedies for low-income clients that, although not sweeping in nature, may
provide relief for at least the most vulnerable and those least able to
represent themselves.
Who are the litigants least able to represent themselves in court, who
would be denied access to our system of justice unless provided with an
attorney to advocate for them? Are there litigants who, once inside the
courtroom, simply cannot understand what is happening or cannot
meaningfully participate in the proceedings, not because they lack
education or experience, but because mental or physical disabilities impair
their understanding? Any attorney who has represented disabled clients in
court, or any judge who has seen litigants with these disabilities attempt to
put on a case or defense, knows that the answer to this question is
frequently a resounding “yes.”
Certain mental disabilities prevent a person from comprehending what is
happening in the courtroom or mustering a case. Some examples come
readily to mind: mental retardation, dementia, schizophrenia, and severe
depression.8 Similarly, certain physical disabilities sap energy or vitality to
the extent that a person is unable to participate meaningfully in court.
Some individuals with brain injuries, terminal illnesses, Parkinson’s
disease, multiple sclerosis, AIDS,9 apraxia,10 and end-stage alcoholism11
may qualify. Simply put, clients with these disabling conditions may be
denied access to our justice system without legal representation.
Most people easily understand why clients with physical disabilities,
such as blindness or hearing loss, need accommodations to get in the
courthouse door and to participate meaningfully in the justice system. For
instance, some deaf individuals are denied access to justice through denial
of a sign-language interpreter in the courtroom.12 Only an interpreter can
translate the conversation in the proceeding and allow the hearing-impaired
person to have her voice heard. Similarly, a person with impaired vision
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may be unable to read critical court documents and exhibits without
accommodations such as Brailled materials, large-printed court documents,
or human readers.13 Without these accommodations, including human
accommodations like readers and interpreters, civil litigants with these
disabling conditions would lose their day in court because they would not
be able to communicate with the court or to understand fully the case and
its consequences.
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)14 is the central law
recognizing this reality for those with such disabilities.15 Complementing
the ADA and its predecessor, the federal Rehabilitation Act,16 some state
anti-discrimination statutes17 provide enhanced protections for individuals
with disabilities in the court system.18 These state and federal laws require
that sign-language interpreters, readers, large print documents, widened
doorways, and wheelchair ramps be provided to people with disabilities
whose access to the system would otherwise be blocked.
In this article, we argue that people whose disabilities prevent them from
understanding the proceedings or vigorously participating in their cases
need accommodations to access the court system, just as do those with
disabilities that require ramps, interpreters, and readers. We argue that the
only reasonable accommodation under Title II of the ADA, under the
Rehabilitation Act, and under state anti-discrimination statutes for litigants
with these disabling conditions is an attorney. Only an attorney can provide
the knowledge, energy, strategy, translation, and understanding to mount a
case or provide a defense for those whose disabilities block their ability to
do so pro se.
Using the ADA to argue for free legal representation as a courthouse
accommodation for certain disabled individuals is both more restrictive and
yet broader than arguing for a full civil Gideon. By definition, ADA
accommodations are available only to persons with perceived or actual
disabilities that affect their ability to participate in the judicial system.
Arguments for a civil Gideon right to counsel for civil litigants does not
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restrict that right only to disabled individuals. Rather, a full civil Gideon
would provide counsel to all litigants who are unable to afford their own
attorney, regardless of disability. On the other hand, the ADA affords a
broader remedy because its provisions are not “needs based”; that is, ADA
accommodations are available to rich and poor alike, and are not restricted
by a litigant’s ability to pay for an attorney accommodation.19 No financial
application is required to receive an ADA accommodation.
The likely reality, however, is that those disabled individuals who need
legal representation to defend or to pursue a claim, and who have the
financial means to hire private counsel of their own choice will do so, even
if, theoretically, they may be provided an attorney as a reasonable
accommodation by the courts free of charge. Finally, individuals with
disabilities are by and large more likely to be poorer than the population as
a whole.20 Thus, the impact of providing legal representation as an
accommodation will most likely benefit those who are financially most in
need.21 As a result, we argue that all civil litigants with disabilities that
prevent them from understanding or participating in the legal system should
receive appointed counsel.
The first section of this article discusses the basic arguments and
procedures for proving a disability under the ADA and seeking legal
representation as a reasonable accommodation for clients in courts. The
second section addresses representation for clients in administrative
hearings. In administrative hearings, clients with disabilities are most often
left to fight alone for rights to food (such as Food Stamps), income (such as
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, General Assistance,
Supplemental Security Income, and Social Security), and health care (such
as Medicare and Medicaid). The third section discusses additional policy
arguments supporting the case for legal representation under antidiscrimination laws. The final section suggests ways to present these
arguments to courts so that eligible litigants can access free legal
representation in appropriate cases.
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I. COURTS VIOLATE THE ADA BY DENYING APPOINTED COUNSEL AS
A REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION FOR CERTAIN DISABLED CIVIL
LITIGANTS.

More than 49.7 million Americans, roughly one in five of the 257.2
million people in the United States age five or older, have mental or
physical disabilities or other long-lasting impairments.22 Before the
enactment of the ADA, Congress recognized that current laws were
“‘inadequate’ to combat the ‘pervasive problems of discrimination that
people with disabilities are facing.’”23 As a result of this discrimination,
Congress enacted the ADA in 1990, seeking to “provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities.”24
Title I of the ADA addresses discrimination in employment and applies
to “persons engaged in an industry affecting commerce” who have at least
fifteen employees (the United States and bona fide private membership
clubs other than labor unions are exempt).25
Title II addresses
discrimination in public services and applies to state and local governments,
their departments, agencies, and other instrumentalities.26 In fact, Title II
covers all public agencies, regardless of whether they receive federal
financial assistance.27 Title III of the ADA addresses discrimination in
places of public accommodation and services operated by private entities.28
Businesses governed by Title III include banks, restaurants, supermarkets,
hotels, shopping centers, privately owned sports arenas, movie theaters,
private day-care centers, schools and colleges, accounting or insurance
offices, lawyers’ and doctors’ offices, museums, and health clubs.29 Title
IV of the ADA addresses telecommunications, including closed captioning
and relay services for people with hearing impairments.30
Denying appointed counsel for certain disabled civil litigants violates
Title II, the Public Services section, of the ADA.31 Title II prohibits
discrimination against disabled individuals in public services.32
Specifically, Title II provides that, “no qualified individual with a disability
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shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be
denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public
entity,33 or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”34 State
courts, as public entities, must comply with Title II of the ADA35 by
ensuring that all of their services, programs, and activities are available to
qualified individuals with disabilities. Federal courts must meet the same
standard under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.36 In fact, Title II of
the ADA was “expressly modeled after”37 sec. 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 197338 and extends those principles to state and local governments.39
Failing to make state court facilities available to disabled individuals
violates the ADA, while failing to make federal court facilities available
violates the Rehabilitation Act.40
The critical importance of the ADA in providing individuals with
disabilities access to the justice system is clearly illustrated by the facts and
legal arguments in Tennessee v. Lane,41 which is currently awaiting a
decision by the U.S. Supreme Court. The State of Tennessee charged
George Lane, a paraplegic who requires a wheelchair to ambulate, with two
criminal misdemeanors and summoned him to court to appear and answer
the charges.
When George Lane showed up at the Polk County Courthouse
with a crushed hip and pelvis, he had a problem. His hearing was
on the second floor, there was no elevator, and the judge said he
had better get upstairs. Mr. Lane, both of whose legs were in
casts, somehow managed to get out of his wheelchair and crawl up
two flights of stairs. “On a pain scale of 1 to 10, it was way past
10,” he says.
While Mr. Lane crawled up, he says, the judge and other
courthouse employees “stood at the top of the stairs and laughed at
me.” His case was not heard in the morning session, he says, and
at the lunch break he crawled back down. That afternoon, when he
refused to crawl upstairs again, he was arrested for failing to
appear, and put in jail.42
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Mr. Lane and another plaintiff, a wheel-chair bound court reporter who
could not work in many Tennessee courtrooms because they were
inaccessible, sued the state on behalf of a class of physically disabled
persons. They argued for injunctive relief and damages under Title II of the
ADA. The State argued that Eleventh Amendment immunity applies,
thereby protecting the State from private suits for money damages. The
Sixth Circuit held that the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the states to
private damages suits did not apply to claims under Title II of the ADA,
when the claim involved the Due Process Clause.
Parties in civil litigation have an analogous due process right to be
present in the courtroom and to meaningfully participate in the
process unless their exclusion furthers important governmental
interests. . . . These guarantees are protective of equal justice and
fair treatment before the courts. The evidence before Congress
when it enacted Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act
established that physical barriers in government buildings,
including courthouses and in the courtrooms themselves, have had
the effect of denying disabled people the opportunity to access
vital services and to exercise fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Due Process Clause.43
In this article, we argue that the denial of equal justice and fair treatment
before the courts applies with equal vigor when a person’s mental or
physical disabilities prevent him not from mounting the stairs to the
courtroom, but from mounting the case itself. Here, the appropriate and
reasonable accommodation is attorney representation rather than elevator
access to the court proceedings.
The failure to make court facilities available to disabled individuals also
violates the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD).44
Generally, WLAD bans discrimination on the basis of “any sensory, mental,
or physical disability.”45 Further, the WLAD makes the right to be free
from discrimination a civil right46 and protects “the right to the full
enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or
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privileges of any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or
amusement.”47 The ADA provides guidance for interpreting a public
entity’s obligations under WLAD.48
To prove that a public program or service violates the ADA, a litigant
need only show that (1) she is a “qualified individual with a disability”; (2)
she “was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a
public entity’s services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise
discriminated against by the public entity”; and (3) “such exclusion, denial
of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his [or her] disability.”49
After a litigant establishes discrimination by a public entity under Title II,
the court must determine the appropriate remedy.50
The ADA provides three ways to prove that a litigant is a “qualified
individual with a disability.” A “person with a disability” is defined as
someone who has “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a
record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an
impairment.”51
Once a litigant proves a disability, she must prove that the disability
excluded her from participating in or denied her the benefits of the court’s
services, programs, or activities. The regulations require that these services,
“when viewed in [their] entirety,” be readily accessible to and usable by
individuals with disabilities.52 Exceptions exist only when compliance
results in “undue financial or administrative burdens” or results in a
“fundamental alteration” in the program.53 The public entity must also
provide notice to individuals with disabilities of the “protections against
discrimination assured them” and “disseminate sufficient information” to
those individuals “to inform them of the rights and protections afforded by
the ADA.”54 Altogether, “the program access requirement of Title II should
enable individuals with disabilities to participate in and benefit from the
services, programs, or activities of public entities in all but the most unusual
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cases.”55 Trial courts, as services within the meaning of Title II,56 must
provide these protections.
The third step in establishing disability discrimination under Title II
requires showing that such exclusion or denial of a service or benefit was
by reason of an individual’s disability.57 Courts fail to make their services
accessible to litigants who are not able to use the system effectively because
of mental or physical impairments. Meaningful access does not exist when
a litigant’s inability to understand or to participate in proceedings because
of a disability surpasses the mere confusion many lay persons experience
when participating in the legal system. As the Honorable Robert W. Sweet,
in proposing full civil Gideon, has noted:
As every trial judge knows, the task of determining the correct
legal outcome is rendered almost impossible without effective
counsel. Courts have neither the time nor the capacity to be both
litigants and impartial judges on any issue of genuine complexity.
As recognized by the Lassiter dissent, “By intimidation,
inarticulateness or confusion, a [litigant] can lose forever” the right
she sought to protect.58
When confusion stems from a disability, Judge Sweet’s admonition
carries even more force. A disabled litigant may be physically present in
the courtroom but have little understanding of the law and proceedings and
little ability to advocate for her rights. A factual showing that a litigant
does not understand proceedings and cannot meaningfully participate
because of a disability compels the court to consider providing reasonable
accommodations.59 A public entity, including a court, must reasonably
accommodate a qualified individual with a disability.60 Mere equality of
treatment is insufficient.61
Upon receiving a request for an accommodation, a public entity’s duty is
well settled by state and federal case law and by the applicable
regulations.62 First, the public entity must undertake a fact-specific
investigation to determine what constitutes a reasonable accommodation
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and must provide the criteria by which to determine whether the evaluation
is adequate.63 The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act attempt to provide
whatever services or actions are necessary to ensure that disabled persons
are not discriminated against as a result of their disabilities. One court
noted, “mere speculation that a suggested accommodation is not feasible
falls short of the reasonable accommodation requirement; the Acts create a
duty to gather sufficient information from the disabled individual and
qualified experts as needed to determine what accommodations [are]
necessary.”64
Necessary accommodations include effective courtroom communications: “a public entity shall take appropriate steps to ensure that
communications with applicants, participants, and members of the public
with disabilities are as effective as communications with others.”65
Appointment of counsel, which would allow the individual with a disability
to communicate with the court, could qualify as a reasonable
accommodation because it is similar to the following sample aids and
services provided in the regulations:
1.

Qualified interpreters, note takers, transcription services,
written materials, telephone handset amplifiers, assistive
listening devices, assistive listening systems, telephones
compatible with hearing aids, closed caption decoders,
open and closed captioning, telecommunications devices
for deaf persons (TDD’s), videotext displays, or other
effective methods of making aurally delivered materials
available to individuals with hearing impairments [for
example, talking calculators and real time transcription];

2.

Qualified readers, taped texts, audio recordings, Brailled
materials, large print materials, or other effective methods
of making visually delivered materials available to
individuals with visual impairments;

3.

Acquisition or modification of equipment or devices; and
other similar services or actions.66
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This extensive list and the final, separate category for “other similar
services or actions” suggest a broadly-based evaluation of appropriate
auxiliary aids and services. These services include the assistance of trained
individuals, such as sign-language interpreters for the deaf and readers for
the blind. Appointed counsel for some litigants with certain disabilities
would serve the same interpretive function and would allow the litigants to
participate in the proceedings.
Appointed counsel would not be necessary for all litigants who suffer
from certain disabilities. The degree of impairment matters, as does the
specific setting and alternative accommodations available. For this reason,
the ADA does not prescribe the appropriate accommodation for each
disability because an appropriate accommodation for one person might be
inappropriate for another. For example, while one visually-impaired person
might need a reader, another might need materials in Braille.67 The public
entity, however, must consider available options and furnish “appropriate
auxiliary aids and services where necessary.”68 In determining the
appropriate aid or service, the public entity shall give “primary
consideration” to the requests of the individual with disabilities.69
Accordingly, a court cannot offer a blanket accommodation for all
individuals with a specific disability; it must consider the particular
individual’s need when determining which accommodations are
reasonable.70
For some litigants with disabilities—those who cannot understand or
participate in the legal proceedings—interpreters are the only appropriate
accommodation.
Other options would not ensure that a court’s
communications with such individuals are “as effective as communications
with others,”71 as required by law.72 For example, although one
commentator has suggested that the best current option for providing legal
assistance for the poor lies in improving pro se assistance projects,73 that
proposal would provide no benefit to litigants whose disabilities impair
their ability to understand or to partake in the legal process. Similarly,
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simplifying the legal process by redrafting forms and restructuring
procedures would not help litigants with such disabilities, even though
simplification might help some indigent civil litigants.74 Even if individuals
with such disabilities could understand simplified forms, they are unlikely
to understand the underlying legal issues. Furthermore, if individuals’
disabilities weaken them to the extent they cannot participate in the process,
a simplified procedure would still preclude meaningful access to the courts.
Arguments that the cost of appointed counsel renders the accommodation
unreasonable lack merit. Providing an attorney for litigants with these
disabilities is not only appropriate but also reasonable in terms of cost,75
and would neither create an “undue burden” for the courts nor
“fundamentally alter” the nature of the court system.76 “Title II ensures that
the refusal to accommodate an individual with a disability is genuinely
based on unreasonable cost or actual inability to accommodate, not on
inconvenience or unfounded concerns about costs.”77 In addressing the cost
issue in the employment context under Title I of the Rehabilitation Act,78
courts have focused on the big picture, namely the overall costs to society
stemming from lack of funding, rather than simply the dollars required to
pay for legal services.79 For example, in Nelson v. Thornburgh, the Third
Circuit concluded that a large state agency was required to accommodate a
group of entry-level welfare agency workers with visual impairments by
providing readers for one-half of the working day and emergency access to
a reader the remainder of the day.80 The court reasoned that “when one
considers the social costs which would flow from the exclusion of persons
such as the plaintiffs from the pursuit of their profession, the modest cost of
accommodation—a cost which seems likely to diminish, as technology
advances and proliferates—seems, by comparison, quite small.”81 While
providing specialists to assist disabled litigants might be an undue hardship
for some small agencies or businesses, providing them for large businesses
or agencies is reasonable.82
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Other considerations also indicate that providing attorneys for litigants
with certain disabling conditions would not bankrupt the system. First, the
number of litigants with such disabilities is relatively small compared to the
pool of indigent civil litigants. Commentators argue that costs, even for full
civil Gideon, are not unduly burdensome and that, in fact, some resources
will be conserved.83 For example, Justice Earl Johnson notes that other
countries have provided free counsel as a matter of right in civil cases, as
have several pre-paid legal insurance programs in this country.84 Bidran
and Ben-Cohen argue that providing counsel for indigent civil defendants
would save society money in the long run85 by reducing litigation and
eliminating the delays prevalent in pro se representation.86 This prediction
is consistent with a study finding that funding legal services programs saves
significant state funds.87 Finally, additional societal benefits, perhaps worth
more than the cost, could accrue, with the primary benefit being restored
confidence in the justice system.88

II. REPRESENTATION FOR APPELLANTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE
HEARINGS

The arguments under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act for legal
representation as a reasonable accommodation apply, in almost the same
manner, to the administrative hearing context. People with disabilities are
regularly appellants in administrative hearings, appealing a state or federal
agency’s denial, reduction, or termination of critical public assistance
benefits involving access to food, shelter, income, and health care. Appeals
of benefits like Unemployment Compensation, Worker’s Compensation,
Food Stamps, Social Security, Supplemental Security Income (SSI),
General Assistance, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF),
Medicaid, and Medicare often involve disabled individuals because
disability is frequently a prerequisite to eligibility for these benefits.89 The
law in these areas can be complex, involving federal and state statutes and
regulations and cases interpreting them. In addition, these hearings can be
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factually complicated, requiring appellants to put on evidence of their
disabilities, work records, medical records, and finances. In most instances,
appellants with disabilities appear pro se at their administrative hearings to
fight for these significant benefits.90
Appellants navigating the hearings process whose disabilities prevent
them from understanding the proceedings or putting on a case would greatly
benefit from the ADA and Rehabilitation Act arguments. State agencies
that hold administrative hearings are, by definition, “public entities” under
the ADA, as are federal agencies under the Rehabilitation Act.91 Like state
and federal courts, executive branch agencies are required by law to include
qualified individuals with disabilities in the provision of all services.92
Courts have applied the Acts to the accessibility of public meetings,93
community mental health board of trustee meetings,94 and access to the
child welfare system.95 Surely, if accommodations are required in these
settings, they are also required in all administrative hearings.96
In fact, the Washington State Office of Administrative Hearings
(OAH)—the state agency responsible for conducting hearings for the state
Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS),97 the Employment
Security Department, and the Office of Superintendent of Public Instruction
(for special education benefits hearings), among forty others—tells public
assistance appellants in the “Hearing Rights” pamphlet it sends with every
Notice of Hearing that it is subject to the ADA and Rehabilitation Act and
will provide reasonable accommodations for disabled litigants to access the
hearing system.98
In the administrative hearings situation, reasonable accommodation
might require attorneys for the hearings of some agencies, but not others.
Unlike the state and federal courts, the administrative hearing setting does
not always require that a legal representative be a licensed attorney.99 For
example, in Washington State, OAH hearings on behalf of DSHS and
Employment Security allow representatives who are not licensed attorneys
to represent appellants.100 For those hearings, arguably, a trained lay
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representative, law student, or paralegal, rather than a lawyer, would be a
reasonable accommodation. In those state101 and federal102 hearings where
only lawyers can act as representatives, however, the only allowable
accommodation is to provide attorney representation.
Legal representation seems critical for public benefits hearings in
particular because they involve access to critical “brutal needs”103
assistance for low-income and disabled litigants, and the law is particularly
complex and difficult to parse. Moreover, because low-income people who
rely on public benefits to meet basic needs lack the resources to hire
lawyers to take their appeals to the court system, the administrative hearing
process is likely the only justice system available to them. Without legal
representation at the hearing, appellants with disabilities that prevent them
from making cogent legal arguments will likely lose.104 Using the ADA to
get representation for these clients as a reasonable accommodation could be
the difference between hunger and adequate nutrition, illness and health
care, or homelessness and shelter.

III. POLICY ARGUMENTS DEMONSTRATING THE REASONABLENESS
OF APPOINTED COUNSEL

Several policy concerns, both national and international, support
appointing counsel for certain individuals with disabilities who are involved
in judicial or administrative proceedings. Moreover, arguments supporting
counsel for indigent civil litigants apply with even greater vigor to the
plight of civil litigants with certain disabilities. These arguments are based
on the historical development of the right to appointed counsel in both
criminal and civil contexts in the United States; the disparity between the
protections afforded to civil litigants by all other major Western nations and
the utter lack of systemic protections for civil litigants in the United States;
and notions of fundamental fairness, both actual and perceived.105
Civil litigants who are disabled to such an extent that they cannot
comprehend or participate in court proceedings have a greater need for
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counsel than other civil litigants, yet courts in the United States have been
reluctant to recognize this need. This reluctance follows a pattern of
incremental recognition of the right to counsel in both the criminal and civil
contexts. Even though the Sixth Amendment unequivocally guarantees the
right to counsel for criminal defendants, only those defendants charged with
capital offenses enjoyed the right prior to the 1930’s.106 From the 1930’s
through the 1960’s, the Supreme Court expanded coverage, first by
recognizing the right to counsel for all federal defendants, then by
extending the right to defendants in state courts in specific situations.107
Appointment of counsel in civil matters, though lagging behind
appointment of counsel for criminal defendants, is not a new concept in the
United States. In 1948, Congress granted the federal courts statutory
authority to appoint counsel for indigent civil litigants.108 The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 1915 as affording district courts
“broad discretion” to determine whether appointment of counsel in a civil
case would be appropriate.109 The Third Circuit rejected several courts’
interpretations that appointment of counsel in civil cases should be granted
only under “exceptional circumstances.”110 Yet even under the exceptional
circumstances analysis, courts have found that, in the balance of factors, the
standard was met to allow appointment of counsel. For example, the Fourth
Circuit found exceptional circumstances existed where the plaintiff lacked
education in legal matters, his incarceration status prevented contact with
witnesses, the testimony was conflicting, and the plaintiff lacked training in
cross-examination.111
In determining whether a district court should order appointment of
counsel, the Third Circuit articulated a number of factors to consider,
without reference to the stringent exceptional circumstances standard.112
The threshold consideration here is whether the plaintiff’s claims have
“arguable merit in fact and law.”113 If the court determines a claim has
sufficient merit, then it must consider factors regarding the plaintiff’s ability
to present her case, such as “education, literacy, prior work experience, and
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prior litigation experience.”114
The court should also weigh the
complexities of the legal issues and the need for factual investigation.115
The appointment of counsel may be appropriate when the likelihood exists
that extensive discovery or expert testimony will be required, or that
credibility determinations will play a significant role in the trial.
The Third Circuit’s test, known as the Tabron test, has been adopted by
one court in a Title II ADA action.116 While the court ultimately held that
the plaintiff was not entitled to appointment of counsel, the court found her
claim sufficiently meritorious to warrant consideration of the additional
factors relevant to the appointment of counsel.117 In weighing the factors,
the court determined that the plaintiff had, at a minimum, a college
education; she presumably had access to public law libraries where she
could conduct any necessary research; expert testimony was unlikely to be
required; and the case did not present unusually complex legal issues.118
These factors weighed against the appointment of counsel in that case. The
door was left open, however, for the appointment of counsel in civil matters
with more compelling circumstances. Arguments for appointed counsel
may prevail, for example, when expert testimony is required, the case
presents unusually complex issues, and the plaintiff does not have a college
education and has a mental disability that prevents her from comprehending
complex matters in the courtroom. When some of these circumstances
exist, plaintiffs should request the assistance of counsel.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964119 also permits courts to appoint
counsel for the plaintiff on request in an employment discrimination suit.120
In making the determination, courts consider three factors: the financial
resources of the plaintiff, efforts made to secure counsel, and the merit of
the plaintiff’s claim.121 Commentators have noted a key conundrum
inherent in the test: the problem of determining the merits of a case before
the case has been presented, especially without counsel to assess and
present the merits.122 This problem is compounded when a litigant has a
disability that prevents or impairs understanding and participating in court
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proceedings. This additional consideration might assist a plaintiff with such
a disability in obtaining counsel in employment discrimination cases.
This individualized, piecemeal approach to achieving the right to counsel
for civil litigants with certain disabilities will likely parallel the same slow,
incremental advancements that have marked the development of the right
for both criminal and civil litigants in this country. While the United States
struggles for incremental advancements, many developed countries provide
appointed counsel for indigent civil litigants,123 even if they are not
disabled. Courts in these countries ground their analyses in statutes, as in
England;124 in constitutions, as in Switzerland; or in a combination of the
two, as in Germany.125 Moreover, the European Convention of Human
Rights “guarantees the right to counsel in civil cases, recognizing it as a
fundamental right.”126
Although United States courts and citizens have generally rejected any
notion that our country is not the world leader in issues of justice,127 some
justices are willing to consider approaches and reasoning of other
nations.128 As Justice Earl Johnson noted, United States Supreme Court
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sandra Day O’Connor, and Anthony
Kennedy, while speaking at conferences, have all suggested that the Court
is willing to consider jurisprudence from other nations.129 In fact, as Justice
Johnson observed, Justice Kennedy, writing for a six-justice majority in
Lawrence v. Texas,130 “relied heavily on foreign decisions.”131
With so many countries recognizing that the right to counsel in civil
cases is fundamental, courts in the United States should follow their lead
and conclude, at the very least, that a disabled individual who cannot
understand or participate in court proceedings is entitled to an attorney.
While the average indigent civil litigant has some understanding of court
processes and proceedings, the person with certain disabilities does not. In
this respect, the United States cannot continue to lag so far behind the other
major Western nations of the world.132

ACCESS TO JUSTICE—A CALL FOR CIVIL GIDEON

One Avenue to Appointed Counsel Before a Full Civil Gideon 627

Three additional notions of fairness, which commentators have noted for
all civil litigants,133 apply with equal or greater force in the present context.
First, in some contexts, civil litigants who may be more disadvantaged by
lack of counsel than criminal litigants.134 For example, the loss of custody
of a child or civil commitment as an incompetent, may, in the long run, be
far more agonizing than incarceration for a short period of time.135 Second,
where the state brings a suit against a disabled defendant to deprive access
to food, shelter, children, or health care, the civil preponderance-of-theevidence standard is much easier to prove than the beyond-a-reasonabledoubt standard for criminal cases.136 As a result, in a civil suit, the state
could more easily prevail and deprive a person of critical benefits. Finally,
citizens lose faith in our justice system when it seems to be unfair.137 Few
acts are more unfair than denying the appointment of counsel for a civil
litigant whose disability prevents her from understanding or participating
effectively in the proceedings.

IV. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN OBTAINING ATTORNEY
REPRESENTATION FOR DISABLED CLIENTS

These ADA arguments may never be made for those most in need unless
an organized approach to evaluating a litigant’s need for an accommodation
and a referral system is in place to get representation for disabled clients.
Yet, finding the litigants that need an attorney accommodation may be
difficult because of the very nature of their disabilities. Litigants whose
disabilities cause them to be too confused or weak to forward their causes in
court may also be unable to ask the court, effectively, for legal
representation. Furthermore, because of their disabling conditions, these
litigants are also unlikely to be able to put forth the sophisticated legal
arguments required to make the case for an attorney accommodation. How,
then, will these cases be brought to the attention of legal services providers
who can then make these arguments on behalf of clients?

VOLUME 2 • ISSUE 2 • 2004

628 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

Advocates for the disabled should take a more proactive and organized
approach in identifying these clients and providing this accommodation by
meeting with court personnel, administrative agency management, and
judges to discuss these issues. Additionally, ADA coordinators in the
courts and in administrative agencies should be assigned the task of
evaluating the need for an attorney accommodation and creating an internal
appeal process for challenging an accommodation denial in the same way
other disability accommodations are evaluated and appealed.
Judges and administrative hearing officers—the people who may be in
the best position to initially identify whether a litigant needs an attorney
accommodation—should be trained to identify and refer litigants to
courthouse ADA coordinators for arranging representation. Courts and
administrative agencies must then develop contracts with legal services
providers to supply legal representation in these cases.
Before such a system is in place, non-profit legal services organizations
may have to create a caller-screening system to identify clients to represent
solely for the purpose of arguing for attorney accommodation in their legal
disputes. Such screening systems are already being developed to find
appropriate plaintiffs to bring litigation to establish a general civil
Gideon.138 To make the argument for an attorney accommodation for
disabled litigants who come to the attention of providers through a
screening process, legal services organizations, advocacy groups for the
elderly and disabled, or pro bono attorneys might have to make special
appearances in identified cases, appearing for the sole purpose of arguing
for an ADA accommodation.
Making a limited appearance, however, has inherent dangers. In a recent
Maryland case, the argument that a free lawyer must be provided to all lowincome civil litigants under the Maryland Constitution was raised.
Although the court did not reach the merits of the issue, it did comment that
“Ms. Frase, as noted, is well represented by counsel in this appeal, and there
is no assurance that, should any further litigation be brought by or against
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Ms. Frase, she would not be represented in that litigation.”139 Further, the
court noted that it would not make the assumption that the five attorneys
and numerous pro bono organizations that specially appeared in the case to
argue for civil Gideon would “then abandon her,” should she need further
representation on the underlying merits of her case.140 Therefore, courts
may, as did the Maryland Court of Appeals, ignore the special appearance
and require that the attorney provide representation in the underlying case.
Advocacy groups and justice systems must address these issues regarding
client identification and referral so that those litigants who need
representation are served. No isolated group can address these issues
effectively. To solve these issues, courts, administrative agencies, nonprofit legal service organizations, bar associations, pro bono attorneys, and
advocacy groups for the disabled must work together to obtain meaningful
results.

V. CONCLUSION
With full civil Gideon still on the distant horizon, advocates should use
the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act to argue that appointed counsel is
necessary for civil litigants with certain disabilities. Both state and federal
courts are required to make their services equally accessible to those with
disabilities. Currently, neither courts nor administrative hearings are
accessible for those whose disabilities impair their capacity either to
understand or to partake in the proceedings. Although alternative aids or
services might be appropriate for some of these litigants, others will require
attorney representation.
Appointed counsel for these civil litigants is not only appropriate but also
reasonable. The number of these litigants is relatively small when
compared to the total number of indigent civil litigants in the country. The
costs seem even smaller compared with the almost certain loss of crucial
needs, such as food, housing, income benefits, and property if the litigant is
without attorney representation. Moreover, greater loss accrues from
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citizens’ lost faith in the justice system. With all the major European
nations and the European Court of Human Rights granting free attorney
representation in civil cases, the United States must be able to protect its
most vulnerable civil litigants: those whose disabilities prevent them from
understanding or fully participating in judicial and administrative
proceedings.
Advocates and the justice system, working together, can remedy this
problem. By focusing on the true meaning of the ADA’s requirement of
reasonable accommodation, the bench and bar can devise methods for
screening and evaluating clients, creating contracts in order to represent
them, and devising systems for administering and evaluating the program.
Only then will civil litigants with certain disabilities have real access to the
justice system.
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attend).
95
Marisol A. by Forbes v. Giuliani, 929 F. Supp. 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that
plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to support claims that state welfare officials violated the
ADA when they mishandled children’s cases by failing to take modest affirmative steps
to ensure that the children had meaningful access to the child welfare system).
96
In one analogous case involving whether or not a school district must accommodate a
disabled parent’s request to tape record a hearing-like meeting involving planning and
placement for her handicapped child, a Connecticut federal district court held that
“participation [in the planning meeting by the parent] means something more than mere
presence; it means being afforded the opportunity to be an equal collaborator, whose
views are entitled to as much consideration and weight as those of other members of the
team, in the formulation and evaluation of their child’s education.” V.W. v. Favolise, 131
F.R.D. 654, 659 (1990).
97
DSHS provides “necessary supplemental accommodations” to disabled clients who
have a “mental, neurological, physical or sensory impairment . . . that prevent [clients]
from getting program benefits in the same way that an unimpaired person would get
them.” WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-472-0010 (2003). See also WASH. ADMIN. CODE §
388-472-0020 to 0050 (2003) for the parameters of the NSA program. These accommo-
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dations should also be required for hearings involving DSHS administered public
benefits.
98
See OFFICE OF ADMIN. HEARINGS, “Your Hearing Rights in a DSHS Case,” OAH
pamphlet #100, DSHS pamphlet #22-092, at http://www.oah.wa.gov/shs_appeals_en.pdf
(last visited on Mar. 29, 2004). The pamphlet tells appellants to contact the OAH office
listed on their Notice of Hearing to arrange for accommodations in the hearing. Id. at 4.
99
For example, in SSI and Social Security administrative hearings, the only obligation
of the Social Security Administration is to inform the appellant of the right to have legal
representation at the hearing, but there is no right to have it provided free of charge and
no requirement that the appellant appear with only a licensed attorney. See Frank v.
Chater, 924 F.Supp. 416, 422, (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (“[a]s an initial matter, it is necessary to
clarify what the cases in this and other Circuits casually refer to as the ‘right to
representation’ in a benefits proceeding. This ‘right’ does not rise to constitutional
dimensions.”); see, e.g., Brandyburg v. Sullivan, 959 F.2d 555, 562 (5th Cir.1992) (citing
Clark, 652 F.2d at 403) (“The Supreme Court has never recognized a constitutional right
to counsel at a SSA hearing.”); Evangelista v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 826
F.2d 136, 142 (1st Cir.1987) (“[T]he applicable standard in these ‘nonadversarial’
proceedings is well below the Sixth Amendment threshold.”). As a result, HHS is not
obligated to provide counsel for the claimant, see Lopez, 728 F.2d at 149, or even to
“guarantee the availability of free legal services.” Clark, 652 F.2d at 403. Rather, the
“right to representation” articulated in these cases refers to a claimant’s freedom to
choose to be represented by counsel in a benefits proceeding.
100
For DSHS hearings, see WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-02-0155: “Who represents you
during the hearing process?
(1) You may represent yourself or have anyone represent you, except a DSHS
employee.
(2) Your representative may be a friend, relative, community advocate,
attorney, or paralegal.”
For Employment Security hearings, see WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 192-04-110.
101
For example, in Washington State, the Administrative Procedures Act provides that
“any party may be advised and represented at the party’s own expense by counsel or, if
permitted by provision of law, other representative” (emphasis added). WASH. REV.
CODE § 34.05.428(2) (2002). Therefore, unless an agency specifically authorizes the use
of non-attorney representatives, it appears that only attorneys can act. Some Washington
state agencies do allow for lay representation. See, e.g., DSHS, WASH. ADMIN. CODE §
388-02-0155 (2003); Employment Security, WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 192-04-110 (2003).
Other state agencies, however, essentially only allow for attorney representation. See,
e.g., Environmental Hearings Board Forest Practices Hearings, WASH. ADMIN. CODE §
223-08-050 (2003); Pollution Control Hearings, WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 371-08-365
(2003); Shoreline Hearings, WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 461-08-385 (2003).
102
On the federal level, in Social Security, SSI, and Medicare hearings held before Social
Security Administration ALJs, the federal regulations covering these hearings allow for
lay representation. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1705, 416.1505 (2003).
103
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970) (finding that the due process right
includes the right to a fair hearing for public assistance denials, using “brutal needs” to
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describe access to food, clothing, shelter, income, and health care). “For qualified
recipients, welfare provides the means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing, and
medical care. Thus the crucial factor in this context . . . is that termination of aid pending
resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very
means by which to live while he waits. Since he lacks independent resources, his
situation becomes immediately desperate. His need to concentrate upon finding the
means for daily subsistence, in turn, adversely affects his ability to seek redress from the
welfare bureaucracy.” Id. at 264.
104
Courts agree that attorney representation in the context of establishing eligibility for
SSI and Social Security Disability can be critical to obtaining benefits. See Frank, 924 F.
Supp. at 427–28:
The potential benefits of having counsel at a benefits proceeding are well
recognized. Indeed, the heightened duty placed on the ALJ by this Circuit is
an attempt to compensate for the disadvantage of proceeding without counsel.
. . . The high rate of remand may well be a function of the fact that, “[u]nder
our system of adjudication, no hearing officer (or judge) will ever be an
equivalent substitute for a lawyer devoted exclusively to a party’s interests.
Cases such as the present one will repeatedly arise until the legal services bar
translates into action the now commonplace observation that agency cases are
usually won or lost at the agency level.”
See also Guzman v. Califano, 480 F.Supp. 735, 737 (1979).
105
See Joan Grace Ritchey, Limits on Justice: The United States’ Failure to Recognize a
Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 317, 331–32, 336–38 (2001);
Johnson, New Melody?, supra note 3 at 222–29 (comparing the legal bases for the right
to appointment of counsel in European countries with those in the United States).
106
Ritchey, supra note 105, at 318–19.
107
Id. at 323.
108
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (2004).
109
See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153 (3d Cir. 1993); see also McKeever v. Israel, 689
F.2d 1315, 1318 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. McQuade, 579 F.2d 1180, 1181 (9th
Cir. 1978).
110
Tabron, 6 F.3d at 155 (stating that “nothing in this clear language [of the statute]
suggests that appointment is permissible only in some limited set of circumstances. Nor
have we found any indication in the legislative history of the provision to support such a
limitation.” The court refers to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (2000) “the court may request an
attorney to represent any such person unable to afford counsel.”)
111
Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 1984); see also Franklin v. Murphy,
745 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1984).
112
Tabron, 6 F.3d at 153.
113
Id. at 155.
114
Id. at 156.
115
Id.
116
Ackridge v. Comm. Dep’t of Human Servs., 5 Nat’l Disability Law Rep. ¶ 236 (E.D.
Pa. May 5, 1994).
117
Id.

ACCESS TO JUSTICE—A CALL FOR CIVIL GIDEON

One Avenue to Appointed Counsel Before a Full Civil Gideon 639

118

Id.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e17 (2000).
120
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). See also Bindra & Ben-Cohen, supra note 83, at 22
(discussing the statute and subsequent case law).
121
Bindra & Ben-Cohen, supra note 83, at 22 (discussing, primarily, Brown v.
Continental Can Co., 765 F.2d 810, 814 (9th Cir. 1985)).
122
Id. at 22–23. The authors reason that if a plaintiff proficiently presents the merits of
the case, the court will deny counsel because the plaintiff is competent. On the other
hand, if the plaintiff inadequately presents the merits, the court will conclude that the
case is frivolous and deny counsel. Id. While the latter proposition is true, under factor
three, the first proposition is not necessarily true. In applying the three-factor test, as
articulated in Brown, courts do not address the plaintiff’s competence. If the plaintiff can
show financial need, inability to obtain counsel, and a meritorious case, then the court
should appoint counsel in employment discrimination cases regardless of the plaintiff’s
competence. For cases brought under other statutes or constitutional provisions,
however, the authors’ point is well-taken, as illustrated in their discussion of Fowler v.
Jones, 899 F.2d 1088, 1096 (11th Cir. 1990). In Fowler, the Eleventh Circuit applied an
exceptional circumstances test in denying a prison inmate appointed counsel in his civil
rights suit against prison officials.
123
Ritchey, supra note 105, at 331–32.
124
Id. at 333.
125
Id. at 334–36.
126
Id. at 332.
127
Johnson, Toward Equal Justice, supra note 75, at 218.
128
Johnson, New Melody?, supra note 3, at 223–26.
129
Id. at 223–24.
130
See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
131
Johnson, New Melody?, supra note 3, at 224.
132
See Ritchey, supra note 105, at 332 (“the United States is the only major Western
nation that does not provide a right to counsel in civil matters,” (quoting Earl Johnson,
Jr., The Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: An International Perspective, 19 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 341, 352–55 (1985))).
133
Id. at 338.
134
Id.
135
Id. But note that some states do provide counsel in similar situations. See, e.g.,
WASH. R. APP. P. 15.2 (providing the right of appointed counsel for indigents in
commitment proceedings under WASH. REV. CODE §§ 71.05, 71.09 (2002) and for
dependency and termination of parental rights cases under WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34).
136
Ritchey, supra note 105, at 338.
137
Id.
138
See CIRCLE manifesto: “The Coalition for Indigent Representation and Civil Legal
Equality (CIRCLE) is comprised of individuals who are committed to the principle of
equal justice for all as fundamental to the system of justice in the state of Washington.”
Memorandum from the Coalition for Indigent and Civil Legal Equality (CIRCLE), to all
119
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Equal Justice Legal Service Providers; “CIRCLE Case Identification Information Form”
used to identify potential clients (on file with Seattle Journal for Social Justice).
139
Frase, 840 A.2d at 130.
140
Id.
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